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Abstract  
Motivated by the European debt crisis and the new EU regulatory regime for the credit 
rating industry, we analyse differences of opinion in sovereign credit signals and their 
influence on European stock markets. Rating disagreements have a significant connection 
with subsequent negative credit actions by each agency. However, links among 
Moody’s/Fitch actions and their rating disagreements with other agencies have weakened 
in the post-regulation period. We also find that only S&P’s negative credit signals affect 
the own-country stock market and spill over to other European markets, but this is 
concentrated in the pre-regulation period. Stronger stock market reactions occur when S&P 
has already assigned a lower rating than Moody’s/Fitch prior to taking a further negative 
action. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis (GFC) consisted of the banking and sub-prime crises 
in 2006-2009 and the European debt crisis (EDC) which started in late-2009. The GFC 
presented challenges for credit rating agencies (CRAs) and triggered increased scrutiny of 
their performance. During the EDC, CRAs faced pressures from various directions on the 
timing and severity of downgrade actions (e.g. see IMF, 2010; Powell, 2013). The main aims 
of this paper are to analyse differences in the negative credit actions of the three largest CRAs 
during the GFC and to assess their impact on European equity markets. We also examine 
whether recent EU regulation of CRAs1 reveals any effects on the CRAs’ negative signals 
and their market impact. The investigation focuses on sovereign ratings, given their crucial 
importance from credit market and financial stability perspectives (European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), 2013a). Sovereign ratings have a strong influence on other 
ratings, including those of banks (e.g. Williams et al., 2013) and corporates (e.g. Borensztein 
et al., 2013). Sovereign credit news can have a strong effect on bond and equity valuations 
(e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 
2012).   
Developed sovereigns have historically been assigned high and stable investment-
grade ratings. Prior to the GFC, it was mainly the emerging economies that experienced low 
credit ratings, ratings instability and split ratings.2 However, this situation has changed 
rapidly in recent years, with ESMA (2013a) noting volatility in European sovereign ratings. 
During the EDC (especially 2010-2012), many European countries, particularly Greece, 
                                                          
1 In this paper, the term ‘recent EU regulation’ refers to the establishment of a new regulatory regime in 
July 2011, when the European Securities and Markets Authority assumed responsibility for European CRA 
regulation. 
2 Split ratings occur when different CRAs assign unequal ratings to the same issuer at the same time. Prior 
studies (e.g. Morgan, 2002; Livingston and Zhou, 2010) attribute split ratings to issuers’ opaqueness or to 
different rating methodologies and differing factors used by CRAs in judging issuers’ creditworthiness. 
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Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, suffered from higher borrowing costs3 and serial negative 
credit signals from CRAs, driven by increased government deficits and debt levels, and weak 
economic growth (e.g. Moody’s, 2011; Fitch, 2012; S&P, 2012). The deterioration in 
European sovereign creditworthiness had an adverse impact on European banks’ ratings, 
funding costs, market access and share prices (e.g. Alsakka et al., 2014; Correa et al. 2014; 
Gennaioli et al., 2014). Split ratings have also been persistent for many high-rated sovereigns, 
such as Austria, France, and the UK during the EDC. Although some European countries 
have shown positive sovereign rating trends since the second half of 2013, they still face 
challenges arising from indebtedness and restrictive financing conditions.   
The rating industry is concentrated among the three largest CRAs. Moody’s (S&P) 
accounts for 34.8% (34.6%) of the market, while Fitch’s share is 17.7% (ESMA, 2013b). 
Issuers seek multiple ratings to address any information gaps across CRAs, hoping to 
improve their ratings. Investors are averse to uncertainty, which can be reduced by additional 
ratings (e.g. Bongaerts et al. 2012; Fabozzi and Vink, 2015). The common practice by 
financial regulators and academic studies to treat the ratings from major CRAs as equally 
informative is questionable. Our investigation reveals significant insights on differences 
among the three CRAs in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. It also identifies 
differences in the manner in which CRAs adjust their ratings, along with differential impact 
of their actions on European equity markets. Such evidence is highly relevant to the 
perceptions of markets and regulators about the credibility of these CRAs. 
The first research question considers the connection between CRAs’ disagreements 
and subsequent negative sovereign credit signals. This is pertinent during the EDC, when 
significant divergence in opinion on the creditworthiness of European countries becomes 
                                                          
3 For example, the weekly average yield spreads of ten-year government bonds over German Bunds 
jumped from below 2 percentage points in 2008 to 32, 12, 7, 5 and 4 percentage points in Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain, respectively, at the end of 2011 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012).  
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discernible. This is the first study to connect the evolution of European sovereign ratings to 
the prior split ratings (see Section 2.1). Valuable information is captured in split ratings, 
which can impact the probabilities of subsequent credit actions (e.g. Livingston et al., 2008). 
Using a daily dataset for 27 European Union (EU) countries for July 2006 to November 2014, 
we reveal that disagreements in CRA opinions have a significant relation with subsequent 
negative credit actions by each CRA. This implies that rating differences across the CRAs 
may improve forecasts of future rating actions. The CRA assigning the superior (inferior) 
ratings may be anticipated to revise its ratings downwards (upwards). It follows that rating 
actions which are inconsistent with this can bring surprise content to the financial markets, 
hence affecting asset prices significantly. Split ratings improve the predictability of 
downgrade actions on the superior ratings, making those actions less influential upon 
financial markets.  
        Hence, we raise a second research question: ‘do pre-event split ratings affect the stock 
markets’ reactions to CRAs’ negative credit signals?’ The originality of this element arises 
from analysing the equity market impact of negative credit signals from the perspective of 
split ratings. In this aspect, we focus only on sovereigns with split ratings immediately before 
a rating action occurs. For a particular event announced by a CRA, the status of its ratings in 
comparison to other CRAs before the events could either weaken or strengthen the stock 
price reactions. We anticipate that downgrades on inferior ratings are expected to elicit 
stronger reactions than downgrades on superior ratings. This second research question is 
motivated by Vu et al. (2015) who show that the reactions of sovereign bond spreads to 
negative credit signals are affected by CRAs’ opinion differences. Whereas Vu et al. (2015) 
study global bond markets during 2000-2012, we examine European stock markets during the 
GFC. Consistent with the findings of Vu et al. (2015), we report that European stock markets 
are only significantly responsive to negative credit signals by S&P (the most independent 
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CRA in terms of rating actions), and that market responses are affected by disagreements 
between S&P and Moody’s/Fitch. Specifically, one-notch downgrades by S&P for a 
sovereign rated lower by S&P than by Moody’s have a strong significant impact on stock 
returns (negative abnormal returns of 1.4%), but similar actions for a sovereign rated higher 
by S&P than Moody’s do not have a significant impact. We also reveal that the impact of 
S&P’s negative signals spills over to stock markets of other European countries. Regional 
links and European Union membership are very likely to drive such spill-over effects (as 
highlighted by, e.g., Mongelli (2008), Alter and Beyer (2014) and Harari (2014)).      
         Our third research question investigates the impact of the recent EU regulation of CRAs 
operating in Europe.4 In response to the role of CRAs at the outset of the GFC, formal EU 
regulation of CRAs was instigated in December 2009. The aim of this new regime was to 
maintain confidence in the rating industry, to decrease overreliance on credit ratings and 
(importantly in our context) to reduce mechanistic market reactions to credit rating signals. In 
July 2011, supervision of CRAs in Europe was assigned to ESMA, which has the power to 
take enforcement action.5 We investigate whether the impact of split ratings on future 
negative credit actions (the focus of our first research question), and the effect of split ratings 
on stock market responses to CRAs’ sovereign negative events (the focus of our second 
research question), vary between pre- and post- EU CRA regulation (with the cut-off in July 
2011). There is very sparse prior literature on such issues.6 Our investigation provides 
indicative evidence of the effectiveness of the recent EU regulation in reducing (mechanistic) 
market reactions. Specifically, we find that the market impact of S&P negative actions is only 
                                                          
4 This presents a further contribution beyond Vu et al. (2015), who did not address the impact of the EU 
regulation of CRAs.    
5 Further details are discussed in Section 2.2. 
6 Jorion et al. (2005) and Poon and Evans (2013) study the impact of U.S. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg 
FD) in 2000 on stock markets and bond markets, respectively. Studies on other forms of regulation 
affecting CRAs relate to periods prior to the EU CRA regulation (e.g. Becker and Milbourn (2011) utilize 
a U.S. sample from 1995 to 2006). 
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significant in the pre-regulation period, in line with our findings that connections among the 
three CRAs’ actions are much more evident in the pre-regulation period.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data sample, Section 4 presents the methodology, Section 5 
analyses the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Key themes associated with the empirical analysis  
2.1. Rating migrations, split ratings and market impact 
Rating dynamics are crucial for the application of risk management and pricing 
(Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007). Estimates of rating migration probabilities are at the core of 
several risk management tools and credit risk managers utilize CRAs’ rating migration 
information. Hence, understanding the factors which affect the probabilities of rating 
transition has wide relevance. Rating volatility (i.e. the frequency and size of rating actions) 
is affected by economic cycles (e.g. Bangia et al., 2002; Livingston et al. 2008), and the 
period that an issuer remains in a specific rating category (e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou, 
2007). Prior rating changes, outlooks and watch status have predictive power for the direction 
of future rating transitions by the same CRA (Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007). Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2010) investigate whether sovereign rating changes by one CRA are affected by 
prior rating changes by another CRA during August 1994 - June 2009 (wherein most of the 
actions relate to emerging countries). They find that upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are 
much higher, and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign with a 
recent upgrade (downgrade) by another CRA. 
Sovereign credit ratings have become one of fund managers’ important considerations. 
Credit rating signals can trigger re-weighting of assets and impact on market prices. Prior 
evidence shows that negative sovereign rating signals have a significant impact on equity and 
bond markets, while positive news has a more limited impact (e.g. Brooks et al., 2004; Gande 
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and Parsley, 2005; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012).7 Ferreira and Gama (2007) 
investigate the cross-country spill-over effects of sovereign rating changes in international 
stock markets, and show that rating downgrades (but not upgrades) trigger cross-border 
effects. Due to the close link between sovereign risk and the operation of the banking system, 
sovereign rating signals can induce reactions in banks’ share prices (Correa et al., 2014). In 
this literature on the market impact of sovereign credit events, the actions of each CRA are 
typically examined independently of each other, whereby the effects of split ratings between 
CRAs are ignored. When one CRA revises their ratings, stock price reactions are likely to be 
affected by whether a split rating is widening or narrowing.  
Prior empirical studies on split ratings have focused on the causes of split ratings and 
the market perception of corporate default risk associated with split-rated issuers (e.g. 
Livingston and Zhou, 2010; Bongaerts et al., 2012). Split ratings have a greater tendency to 
occur for opaque issuers (e.g. Morgan, 2002). Livingston et al. (2008) find that split rated 
corporates are prone to be upgraded (downgraded) by the CRA from whom a lower (higher) 
rating exists.8 Livingston et al. (2010) show that the pricing of corporate credit risk is 
exercised based on both the CRA’s credit opinions and the opinion differences, where the 
heavier weight is placed on the more conservative CRA. Bongaerts et al. (2012) highlight that 
corporates seek a third rating from Fitch as a “tie-breaker” for debt issues which are split 
rated by S&P and Moody’s. Vu et al. (2015) find that bond market reactions are far stronger 
for negative signals on the inferior ratings and for positive signals on the superior ratings. 
                                                          
7 To the extent that stock and bond prices are found to respond to credit rating signals, this implies either 
evidence against the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis or the presence of private 
information available only to CRAs that is released into the public domain through credit signals (e.g. 
Brooks et al, 2004). If rating signals did not add information, then CRAs’ opinions would not matter, and 
there would be no policy or regulatory concern regarding their activities, which is not the case. 
8 Livingston et al. (2008) investigate the links between split ratings and rating migrations, using a sample 
of corporate issuers rated by S&P and Moody’s over the period 1983 to 2001, while we address a related 
question for European sovereign issuers using more recent data (of crucial importance given the GFC). We 
also consider outlook and watch status, and include data from Fitch.  
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CRAs form their opinions on sovereign creditworthiness based on a combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative considerations in accordance with proprietary methodologies 
(ESMA, 2013a). Some factors used by CRAs are similar, i.e. CRAs in common consider 
GDP per capita, governmental financial resources, political stability and debt structure (e.g. 
Mellios and Paget-Blanc, 2006), but they use some different qualitative and quantitative 
factors and attach different weights to these factors (e.g. IMF, 2010; Fabozzi and Vink, 
2015). S&P emphasises the probability of default, while Moody’s uses an ‘expected losses’ 
approach, which accounts for default probability and loss given default assessments. Fitch 
considers probability of default and recovery given default. These factors can result in 
disagreements about the rating level and outlook/watch status of an issuer, leading to split 
ratings. These factors could also affect the manner in which CRAs adjust their ratings or 
review their outlook or watch status, and how equity markets react to credit signals from 
different CRAs. 
 
2.2. Recent EU regulatory reforms affecting the rating industry  
CRAs have faced increased scrutiny during the GFC. Efforts have been made to 
enhance the performance, transparency and supervision of CRAs, and to reduce the reliance 
on ratings (IMF, 2010). In particular, the supervision of CRAs has been tightened. In 
December 2009, the EU instigated regulation for CRAs within the European jurisdiction, 
including registration procedures, governance requirements, internal controls, disclosure rules 
and improvements in rating methodologies. The phased EU regulation comprised CRA I 
Regulation in December 2010, CRA II Regulation in May 2011 and CRA III Regulation in 
November 2011. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) assumed 
responsibility for CRAs’ regulation in Europe in July 2011. The European Commission is 
required to report to the Parliament by July 2016 to reassess the state of affairs. 
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         EU regulators are striving to reduce reliance on CRAs by removing/replacing the 
references to CRA ratings in regulations and collateral policies. However, ESMA (2015) has 
identified the elimination (or changing) of all rating-dependent regulation as impractical and 
now recommends mitigating the mechanistic reliance on ratings. Our third research question 
contributes to the policy agenda by investigating whether the recent EU regulation of CRAs 
has any effects on the CRAs’ negative signals and their market impact. 
 
3. Data sample 
The sample consists of daily long-term foreign-currency sovereign ratings, watch 
status and outlook status which have been assigned by the largest three CRAs (Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P) from July 2006 to November 2014 for 27 countries in the European 
Union (EU).9 The rating announcements are collated directly from CRAs’ publications. We 
identify actual rating changes according to a mapped 20-notch numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 
20, AA+/Aa1 = 19, AA/Aa2 = 18 … CCC-/Caa3 = 2, CC/Ca, SD-D/C = 1)10, by notches on 
the basis of daily intervals. In addition, to identify credit signals we use a 58-point rating 
scale; this is a comprehensive credit rating (CCR) scale that incorporates both the actual 
ratings and credit outlook/watch status11, as follows: AAA/Aaa = 58, AA+/Aa1 = 55, 
AA/Aa2 = 52 … CCC-/Caa3 = 4, CC/Ca, SD-D/C = 1, and we add ‘+2’ for positive watch, 
‘+1’ for positive outlook, ‘-1’ for negative outlook, ‘-2’ for negative watch, and ‘0’ for stable 
                                                          
9 The start date is chosen as broadly consistent with Arezki et al. (2011). See the Appendix for the list of 
countries. Croatia joined the EU in July 2013, which is too late for this sample period.  
10 AAA/Aaa rated issuers have the highest quality and the lowest default risk, while issuers rated at SD-
D/C categories are in default. See Tichy (2011) for a fuller explanation of the alphabetical ratings. 
11 A complete CRA credit opinion on an issuer consists of a credit rating and a rating outlook/watch status. 
Several studies (e.g. Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012) find that outlook and watch signals are at 
least as important as rating changes in their market impact. Using the CCR scale, the same numerical score 
may represent different credit status. For example, issuers rated AAA with negative watch and AA+ with 
positive outlook carry the same numerical score ‘56’. However, migrations between states with the same 
numerical score are extremely unlikely and there are no such cases in the data sample. Also, in the lowest 
numerical category, the only case of outlook/watch was when Greece was rated CC/Negative outlook by 
S&P between 27 July 2011 and 27 February 2012, and we include this in numerical category ‘1’ using the 
58-point rating scale.   
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outlook and no watch/outlook assignments (Sy 2004). Negative (positive) outlook signals 
arise from (i) cases of changes to negative (positive) outlook from stable/positive 
(stable/negative) outlook, and (ii) cases of changes to stable outlook from positive (negative) 
outlook. Negative (positive) watch signals are recorded (i) in cases when a given sovereign is 
placed on review for possible downgrade (upgrade), and (ii) in cases when a sovereign rating 
is confirmed subsequent to a review for possible upgrade (downgrade).  
         There are 75,743 daily observations for each CRA. Figure 1 presents the distribution of 
daily numerical ratings. AAA/Aaa ratings represent 34% of the total number of daily 
observations. This is driven by some AAA/Aaa–rated sovereigns having no rating actions 
throughout the sample period (e.g. Denmark and Sweden). Speculative-grade ratings 
represent only 8.6% of the total. The average rating of the 27 EU countries by each CRA is 
‘16’ (‘A+/A1’) using the 20-notch scale. Using the 58-point scale, S&P assigns a slightly 
lower average rating (‘45’) than Moody’s and Fitch (‘46’). 
       Rows 1-17 of Table 1 summarize the sovereign credit signals. The majority of the signals 
are negative (37 solo rating downgrades, 62 negative watch signals, 66 negative outlook 
actions, and 134 combined actions of rating downgrades and negative watch or outlook 
signals). In comparison, there are 165 positive signals. S&P is the most active CRA with 191 
credit events, whereas there are 136 and 137 events by Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. This 
can be attributed to S&P’s greater emphasis on short-term accuracy (100 outlook signals and 
45 watch actions). Moody’s is more likely than other CRAs to adjust its sovereign ratings by 
multiple notches when the actions are taken (Row 15). Rows 18-26 of Table 1 summarize the 
credit actions using the 58-point scale, and a similar picture emerges.12  
       Figure 2 presents the distribution of signals using the 58-point scale. A weak positive 
trend continues until 2008-H1, followed by a dramatic increase in unfavourable news until 
                                                          
12 Table 1 also presents the descriptive statistics for pre- and post-regulation sub-samples. The cut-off date 
is 1 July 2011 because ESMA assumed supervisory responsibility at this time (see Section 2.2).  
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June 2013, especially in 2011-H2 and 2012-H1. The growing downgrade pressure arises from 
weakening public finances and growth, along with heightened concerns about excessive long-
term government debt. The rating signals are spatially concentrated, whereby Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are most prominent in downgrades. A weak 
positive trend is observed in 2013-H2 and 2014-H1, driven by the reported (yet weak) growth 
as a result of significant structural adjustment and institutional reform along with a related 
reduction in market stress (e.g. Moody’s, 2013, Fitch, 2014; S&P, 2014; ECB, 2015). A 
similar picture emerges on comparing the distribution of credit actions in the pre-regulation 
period from 1st July 2006 to 30th June 2011, and the post-regulation period from 1st of July 
2011 to 30th November 2014 (see Table 1).13  
Table 2 shows that rating disagreements are common across the CRAs, with 52.2% 
(39.9%) of daily observations in the case of S&P and Moody’s (Fitch) and 40.4% between 
Moody’s and Fitch, based on the 20-notch scale. Most rating differentials are one notch, 
however in some cases the split can reach up to 5 notches. Using the 58-point scale, there are 
inevitably higher percentages of rating differentials, whereby the highest frequency of splits 
is between S&P and Moody’s (63.1%), versus 51.8% (52.9%) between Fitch and S&P 
(Moody’s).14 Moody’s tends to be the most generous CRA during the pre-regulation period, 
assigning higher ratings than Fitch in 80.1% (80.0%) and S&P in 89.0% (89.6%) of total split 
cases based on the 20-notch (58-point) scales. Moody’s tends to be the harshest CRA in the 
post-regulation period, assigning lower ratings than Fitch in 77.1% (79.6%) and S&P in 
56.5%% (56.9%) of total split-rated cases, based on the 20-notch (58-point) scales. S&P 
                                                          
13 As a comparison, during the pre-GFC period of September 2000-June 2006, the sample of 27 EU 
sovereigns used in this paper had very stable ratings, with only 26 credit signals by Moody’s, 42 by S&P 
and 45 by Fitch. During that period, positive credit signals (25 by Moody’s, 30 by S&P and 35 by Fitch) 
hugely outnumbered negative signals (1 by Moody’s, 12 by S&P and 10 by Fitch). This was driven by 
economic growth, the accession of some countries to the EU, and a benign macroeconomic environment. 
14 Almost all countries in the sample have experienced split ratings during the period July 2006-November 
2014 using the 58-point rating scale, with the exceptions of Denmark and Sweden across the three CRAs, 
and Finland in the case of Moody’s versus Fitch.    
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appears to be harsher than Fitch, with S&P assigning a lower rating than Fitch in around 80% 
of cases during the pre-regulation period and 66% of the cases in the post- regulation period.  
The high percentages of disagreement between CRAs on their assessment of the 
creditworthiness of European countries are not surprising. In the GFC context, it is more 
difficult to determine the amounts and recoverability of vast potential losses to investors from 
holding sovereign debt. Investors holding Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt are potentially 
exposed to bailout agreements, which are dependent on successful implementation of 
austerity programmes. Moreover, the strong interdependence among EU countries 
complicates the assessment of cross-border debt holdings and potential spill-over effects. 
There are differences of opinion about EU countries’ prospects for effective spending cuts, 
increased tax revenues/compliance, economic growth, support for banking systems, and the 
countries’ financial and economic stability.  
 
4. Methodology 
For the analysis of split ratings, both directions (rating, outlook or watch status from a 
given CRA is higher or lower than that from the other CRA) and size of split rating are 
considered. Models for future downgrades and upgrades should be estimated separately due 
to their expected different behaviour (e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007; Livingston et al., 
2008). Because of limited upgrades within the sample (see Table 1)15, we only estimate 
downgrade models, as follows: 
)1,0(N~;YCoGrowthSpecA-Outlook-L
A-Outlook-HA-Watch-LA-Watch-H
A-L-2NA-L-1NA-H-2NA-H-1NDN
iitiiyitim8
im7im6im5
im4im3im2im1
B
t,i
*






      (1) 
                                                          
15 Positive credit signals are mainly concentrated in the 12-month period between July 2013 and June 2014 
(see Figure 2). On estimating Eq. (1) and (2) with positive credit signals as the dependent variable, the 
results show mixed results, with either insignificant links between split ratings and positive credit actions 
or incorrect signs. Mixed results also appear in the post-regulation period (which has a relatively higher 
number of positive signals).  
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*
t,iDN is an unobserved latent variable related to the observed ordinal rating changes t,iDN that 
equals 1, 2, 3, or 4, representing downgrades (by CRA B in Eq. (1) and by CRA A in Eq. (2)) 
by 1, 2, 3 and > 3 CCR points using the 58-point scale, or 0 otherwise. The link between 
*
t,iDN and t,iDN  is:  
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Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the cut-off points z  (where 4321   ) and 
the β, λ, γ, ψ and ζ coefficients.  
1N-H-Aim (2N-H-Aim) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has one notch 
(> one-notch) higher rating from CRA A than from CRA B at 90 days16 (m) prior to the credit 
action at time t, 0 otherwise. 
1N-L-Aim (2N-L-Aim) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has one notch (> 
one-notch) lower rating from CRA A than from CRA B at 90 days prior to the credit action at 
time t, 0 otherwise. 
H-Watch-Aim (L-Watch-Aim) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has a 
watch status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by CRA A than that by CRA 
B at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
16 The choice of the 90-day look-back time horizon (for 1N-H-Aim, 2N-H-Aim, 1N-L-Aim, 2N-L-Aim, H-
Watch-Aim, L-Watch-Aim variables in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) is consistent with Williams et al. (2013) and Alsakka 
et al. (2014). Further, the CRAs express an ex-ante target of 90 days to take action once an issuer is placed 
on a watch list (e.g. Williams et al., 2013).   
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H-Outlook-Aim (L-Outlook-Aim)  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has 
an outlook status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by CRA A than that by 
CRA B at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 
Specit is a control dummy taking the value of 1 if sovereign i is rated at the speculative-grade 
category within the prior 90 days (by either CRA A or B) before the rating change by the 
potential follower, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included to account for the influence of 
the current level of rating on subsequent credit actions. 
Growthit indicates the annual GDP growth rate (obtained from the World Bank) in country i 
in the year of the rating change by the follower CRA. It controls for any effect of the business 
cycle in country i on the probabilities of subsequent credit actions, and its inclusion is 
motivated by Bangia et al. (2002) and Livingston et al. (2008).  
Co is a series of country dummy variables to control for any country-specific effects. 
Y is a series of year dummies, which are included to account for the time effect, i.e. potential 
variation in rating change patterns over the sampled years. 
We calculate the marginal effects (MEs) to estimate the economic impact of the 
significant factors on the probabilities of rating changes. MEs estimate the change in the 
dependent variable that is caused by a 1-unit change in an independent variable when the 
other independent variables are kept at their mean.  
        Following the investigation of rating transitions of split-rated European countries, we 
examine the information content of sovereign credit signals in the domestic stock markets. As 
above, we only investigate negative signals. The data on equity market indices are obtained 
from Bloomberg L.P. and the headline indices in each national stock market are used.17 We 
estimate the models as follows: 
ittit3it2it1itit
YCoVIXSPRIOREVENTCCRCCRCAR        (3) 
                                                          
17 The list of the national stock market indices along with the descriptive statistics are provided in the 
Appendix. 
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CARit is the cumulative mean-adjusted abnormal return for days t and t+1 of country i subject 
to the credit event announced on day t (see Hill and Faff, 2010). The mean return, which 
represents the expected daily return, is calculated using 120 trading days, from day t-130 to 
day t-11. The daily abnormal log return is derived by subtracting the expected log return from 
the realized log return on market indices. Abnormal log returns are accumulated over the two 
consecutive days to give cumulative abnormal returns. Using returns in a very short window 
[t, t +1] avoids the contamination problem documented by Gande and Parsley (2005). 
Abnormal returns are denominated in USD in order to ensure that returns for different 
markets are comparable (e.g. Correa et al., 2014). Moreover, USD returns are the most 
relevant measure of stock performance from the perspective of international investors.18  
itCCR  represents the credit signals variable; the downgrade by the CRA on an event date, 
measured in CCR points. For ease of interpretation, we take the absolute values of itCCR .  
CCRit is the average of pre-event ratings assigned by the two CRAs to country i on date t-1. It 
is considered as a control variable which summarizes the economic fundamentals, political 
and financial conditions of the sovereign i when the credit event occurs.  
PRIOREVENTSit is the cumulative CCR changes of country i during the 14 days prior to day 
t. This captures the intensity of event clustering emphasized by Gande and Parsley (2005).  
VIXt controls for the effect of market volatility on the sensitivity of stock prices to adverse 
information. VIXt is the log change of the CBOE Volatility index during the event window 
                                                          
18 If returns are converted from the home currencies of the six countries outside the Euro-zone into Euros, 
these become foreign currency returns and subject to exchange rate fluctuations, whereas the returns for 
the 19 Euro-zone countries would remain local currency returns and unaffected by exchange rates. Due to 
this inconsistent treatment of returns as either in local or foreign currency when returns are measured in 
Euros, we convert returns for all countries into US Dollars as a common foreign currency. However, as a 
robustness test, we also estimate Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) using returns denominated in Euros, and qualitatively 
similar results are obtained. The tables are not reported in the interests of brevity but are available on 
request. 
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(obtained from Datastream). We anticipate abnormal returns to be negative in response to 
negative signals and the reactions to be more pronounced when market volatility is high.  
Co and Y are defined as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
We use negative credit signals for split rated sovereigns only, i.e. 446 events which 
relate to 25 European countries (i.e. excluding Denmark and Sweden). On matching rating 
data with equity market data, the number of negative events is reduced from 446 to 416 
(consisting of 211 events in the pre-regulation period and 205 events in the post-regulation 
period). Following Ferreira and Gama (2007), for each country in the sample, events are 
matched with an equal number of non-events collected randomly from all the non-event days 
available in the period. In order to ensure that returns on non-event days do not reflect a 
reaction to a rating signal, non-event days must be outside a 61-day event window (t-30, 
t+30). Hence, the intercept in Eq. (3) reflects the average abnormal returns for a non-event 
day and the slope coefficient   measures the incremental returns on event days when CRAs 
announce a unit change in CCR. 
For every event by a particular CRA, the pre-event rating affected by the announcement 
is either inferior (lower) or superior (higher) to the second rating assigned by another CRA 
which remains unchanged on the event date. To test the specific reactions of stock markets to 
credit signals for lower and higher ratings, itCCR  is interacted with two separate dummy 
variables namely itSUP  and itINF . itSUP  takes the value of one if the CRA’s rating subject 
to the announcement is superior (higher) compared with the other CRA, and zero otherwise. 
itINF  takes the value of one if the CRA’s rating subject to the announcement is inferior 
(lower) compared with the other CRA. The model is specified as follows: 
       
ittit3
it2it1itit2itit1it
YCoVIX
SPRIOREVENTCCRINFCCRSUPCCRCAR




    (4) 
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Coefficients 
1 and 2 measure the specific effects of a negative outlook signal (a change by 
one CCR point) for the superior ratings and inferior ratings, respectively. Vu et al. (2015) 
apply a similar specification to study global bond markets. To estimate the effect of a one-
notch downgrade (three CCR points), 
1 and 2 are multiplied by three. We anticipate that 
downgrading the inferior ratings leads to a more significant decrease in stock prices, hence 
we expect
2 to be significant and larger than 1 .
19 
        We also examine the impact of split ratings on the cross-border effects of negative credit 
actions in Europe by each CRA. For each sovereign event in the home country i (i.e. ∆CCRit), 
we pool all the non-event countries j and compute the abnormal returns of their stock market 
indices in the window [t, t+1] (i.e. CARjt). We match each set of non-event country returns for 
a given event in the home country i with randomly selected clean non-event-day observations 
for these non-event countries. We estimate the following equations: 
      
ittjit4
it3jt2it1itjt
YCoCoVIX
SPRIOREVENTCCRCCRCCRCAR




                        ,ij    (5) 
      
ittjit4it3
jt2it1itit2itit1jt
YCoCoVIXSPRIOREVENT
CCRCCRINFCCRSUPCCRCAR




  ,ij    (6) 
Similar to Eq. (3) and (4), we include full sets of year and country dummies (event country 
and non-event country), prior events, log change of the CBOE Volatility index and the levels 
of event and non-event country comprehensive credit rating. 
Finally, to investigate whether the recent EU regulation of CRAs reveals any effects 
on the CRAs’ signals and their market impact, we estimate Eqs. (1) - (6) during two periods: 
                                                          
19 Following Vu et al. (2015), we apply Yohai’s (1987) MM-robust regression method using the full range 
of available observations to detect influential data points before estimating Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). Every 
observation whose standardized residual and/or robust distance lies far beyond the ‘normal range’ is an 
outlier and is hence deleted from the samples. The definition of normal range depends on the distributions 
of the standardized residuals and robust distance which vary across the samples. Nonetheless, in most 
cases, outliers are outside the range [-5, +5] of robust standardized residuals and [0, 40] of the robust 
distance. The regressions are estimated as specified after outliers have been eliminated. 
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pre-regulation (1st July 2006 – 30th June 2011) and post-regulation (1st July 2011 – 30th 
November 2014). The cut-off date is selected to reflect the establishment of a new regulatory 
regime in July 2011, when ESMA assumed responsibility for CRAs’ regulation in Europe. 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1. Relationship between split ratings and rating dynamics 
Table 3 presents the results of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the full sample. Panel I 
considers the connection between S&P-Moody’s disagreements and Moody’s negative 
actions. Sovereigns with either inferior S&P outlook status or >1-notch lower S&P rating 
have increased probabilities of Moody’s downgrades by 1, 2, 3 and >3 CCR points of 0.04%, 
0.02%, 0.02% and 0.02%, respectively. The MEs are economically significant given that the 
proportion of Moody’s negative signals to the total number of daily observations is 0.12% 
(88/75743). Panel II considers the link between S&P-Moody’s disagreements and S&P 
negative actions. S&P is less likely to downgrade sovereigns with a higher Moody’s rating, 
while disagreements on outlook status increase the probabilities of S&P negative actions.   
For S&P-Fitch, Panel III shows that sovereigns with >1-notch lower S&P rating or 
with inferior outlook or watch status by S&P are more likely to experience negative actions 
by Fitch. Panel IV identifies that S&P negative signals are only affected by disagreements 
with Fitch on outlook status. For Moody’s-Fitch, Panels V and VI show that sovereigns with 
lower Moody’s rating are more likely to experience negative actions by Fitch, while those 
with >1-notch lower rating or with inferior outlook status by Fitch are more likely to 
experience negative actions by Moody’s.  
Tables 4-6 present the results of Eq. (1) and (2) during the pre-regulation (Panels I 
and II) and post-regulation (Panels III and IV) periods. Table 4 considers S&P-Moody’s 
disagreements. Sovereigns with lower S&P rating or with inferior S&P outlook or watch 
status have much increased probabilities to experience negative actions by Moody’s during 
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the pre-regulation period only. Sovereigns with lower S&P rating or with inferior S&P 
outlook status are less likely to experience negative actions by S&P. The latter is consistent 
across pre- and post-regulation periods, but the MEs are larger in the post-regulation era, 
implying a stronger (but still limited) connection between S&P signals and any disagreement 
with Moody’s.   
Similar to Moody’s case in Table 4, we find that Fitch’s actions illustrate very limited 
linkages with S&P post-regulation (Table 5). Sovereigns with lower S&P rating or with 
inferior S&P outlook or watch status are more likely to experience negative actions by Fitch 
during the pre-regulation period. In contrast, S&P negative signals are not influenced by split 
ratings with Fitch during the pre-regulation period. Table 6 reveals that negative signals by 
Fitch and Moody’s also demonstrate very limited connection with their rating disagreements 
in the post-regulation period, while the pre-regulation period offers strong evidence of 
connections between these two CRAs.  
To summarize, disagreements about ratings and outlook status (and to a lesser extent 
watch status) of European sovereigns are linked to subsequent CRA negative actions. In 
comparisons with Moody’s or Fitch, S&P’s decisions on issuing negative signals are less 
strongly connected with their disagreements with the other CRAs. Notably, Moody’s (Fitch) 
actions demonstrate very limited connection with S&P and Fitch (Moody’s) during the post-
regulation period. There is evidence of stronger (yet still limited) links between S&P negative 
actions and its split ratings with Fitch and Moody’s during the post-regulation period 
compared to pre-regulation.  
 
5.2. The impact of split ratings on stock markets’ reactions to negative credit signals 
Estimation results for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are reported in Table 7. Section 5.1 highlights 
relatively weaker connections of split ratings between S&P and Moody’s/Fitch upon S&P’s 
negative rating actions. Therefore, we anticipate that S&P’s actions could contain more 
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surprise content and therefore greater market impact. Panel I of Table 7 supports this. Stock 
price reactions to S&P’s negative actions are stronger on their inferior than superior ratings 
versus Moody’s/Fitch, supporting our anticipation that such negative actions on inferior 
ratings are less predictable. The reported estimates are around -0.46% for a negative outlook 
signal (i.e. -1.38% for a one-notch downgrade (three-point CCR decrease)) on inferior S&P 
ratings.  
       Section 5.1 shows that Moody’s and Fitch signals are relatively more connected with 
disagreements with other CRAs. Moody’s and Fitch signals are more predictable from the 
pre-event split ratings, thus we expect that their signals do not affect the markets as strongly 
as S&P, and Table 7 supports this. In Panels II and III, the coefficients on credit signal 
variables and their interactions with pre-event split ratings are not statistically significant.  
      In summary, Table 7 adds important evidence to support our expectation about the market 
reactions to negative signals for split-rated European countries. Split ratings increase the 
likelihood that the higher ratings will be downgraded. S&P’s decisions to downgrade ratings 
which are already inferior to those assigned by other CRAs impart strong signals about 
weakening creditworthiness. This is in line with Vu et al. (2015) for global bond markets. 
Table 8 presents the results for S&P’s negative credit signals during the pre- and post-
regulation periods.20, 21 The market effect of S&P’s actions is concentrated in the pre-
regulation period when S&P’s signals demonstrate very limited connections with its rating 
disagreements with the other CRAs (see Tables 4 and 5). In Panel I (II) of Table 8, abnormal 
returns on the domestic stock markets in the event window are estimated at -0.47% (-0.39%) 
when S&P announces a negative outlook signal in the pre-regulation period. For sovereigns 
                                                          
20 Since there are insufficient events with superior ratings in the first estimation (the number of events is 
less than 10), we drop that variable.   
21 Equivalent estimations were completed for Moody’s and Fitch negative signals. Consistent with Table 7, 
none of the coefficients of interest were significant. Hence, the tables are not reported in the interests of 
brevity but are available on request. 
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rated lower by S&P than Moody’s, Panel I shows a coefficient of -0.3% for a negative 
outlook signal. Section 5.1 highlights a stronger link between S&P’s signals and its 
disagreements with other CRAs in the post-regulation period. The insignificant coefficients in 
Table 8 for the post-regulation period are consistent with this. In summary, the sub-period 
analysis reveals evidence of a possible effect of the European CRA regulation on the stock 
market reactions to S&P’s signals.  
 
5.3. Spill-over effects 
 Prior studies have reported that the market impact of rating signals extends beyond 
geographical borders (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011). We investigate the impact of split ratings on 
the cross-border effects of negative credit actions by the three CRAs, using Eq. (5) and Eq. 
(6), with the results presented in Table 9. We find significant stock market reactions in non-
event countries j in the anticipated direction when S&P announces a negative credit action on 
the event country i. The strong evidence in the case of S&P is consistent with Section 5.2 on 
the ‘own-market’ effects. The pre-event split ratings influence the intensity of the spill-over 
effects in non-event countries. When S&P rates lower than either Moody’s or Fitch and 
downgrades a country, we find significant negative abnormal returns of 0.31% (when S&P 
rates lower than Moody’s) and 0.25% (when S&P rates lower than Fitch), which are up to 
five times larger than the abnormal returns estimated for the negative outlook actions that 
occur when S&P rates higher than either Moody’s or Fitch.22 
 We also examine the spill-over effects during the pre- and post-regulation periods. 
A similar picture emerges when we consider spill-over effects in the pre-regulation period 
compared with the results in Table 9. Interestingly, we observe much weaker and inconsistent 
                                                          
22 Unexpectedly, a negative credit action by Moody’s (Fitch) for a given event country induces a positive 
reaction in stock markets of its neighbour (non-event) countries in the region. However, the magnitude of 
the coefficients on the rating change variable ∆CCRit is small (below 0.1%). Importantly, when split ratings 
are taken into account, Moody’s (Fitch) negative actions induce negative responses in non-event countries, 
and this applies when Moody’s (Fitch) assigns lower ratings than S&P (Moody’s). 
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spill-over effects in the post-regulation period. For example, when S&P announces a negative 
outlook signal, the non-event countries’ abnormal returns are estimated at -0.31% in the pre-
regulation period, while the coefficient is insignificant in the post-regulation period. Also, 
S&P negative outlook signals on sovereigns rated lower by S&P than Fitch induce negative 
abnormal returns of 0.11% in the post-regulation period compared to 0.27% pre-regulation. 
This is consistent with Section 5.2.23   
 In summary, these findings show that negative signals by S&P not only affect the 
own-country stock markets but also spill-over to other European countries’ stock returns. Yet, 
the effect is weaker following the recent EU regulation of CRAs. Consistent with Section 5.2, 
there are stronger spill-over reactions when S&P assigns a lower rating than the other CRAs 
prior to its downgrade action. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines credit actions by the largest three CRAs (Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch) during the GFC. We investigate: (i) the impact of differences in ratings and 
outlook/watch status across CRAs on subsequent credit signals, (ii) the effect of split ratings 
on the stock market response to CRAs’ sovereign credit events (both own-country and spill-
over effects), and (iii) the influence of the recently established European regulatory regime 
for CRAs in the context of (i) and (ii).  
The dataset covers 27 EU sovereigns from July 2006 to November 2014, and we 
employ a 58-point scale to incorporate rating changes plus outlook and watch signals. We 
highlight that differences of rating opinion are very common in the sample, particularly when 
outlook and watch status are considered. Disagreements about sovereigns’ creditworthiness 
have a significant effect on subsequent negative credit actions by each CRA. S&P negative 
signals have the weakest links with its divergence in opinion about European sovereigns’ 
                                                          
23 The tables are not reported in the paper in the interests of brevity but are available on request. 
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creditworthiness with the other two CRAs. The connections among the Moody’s/Fitch 
actions and their disagreements with other CRAs tend to be stronger in the pre-regulation era.  
European stock markets only react significantly to negative credit signals by S&P, the 
CRA whose actions have least connection with those of other CRAs. Investor reactions are 
strongly influenced by split sovereign ratings between S&P and Moody’s. A one-notch 
downgrade by S&P for a sovereign rated lower by S&P than Moody’s is associated with a 
negative abnormal return of 1.4%, but similar actions for a sovereign rated higher by S&P 
than Moody’s do not have a significant impact on stock returns. Pre-event rating differences 
between Moody’s and S&P/Fitch, and between Fitch and S&P/Moody’s do not affect the 
stock market reactions to Moody’s nor Fitch negative signals. Negative signals by S&P (but 
not other CRAs) also spill-over to other European countries’ stock returns. Finally, stock 
markets’ reactions to CRAs’ negative signals in the post-regulation period are much weaker. 
The objective of implementing the recent regulation of CRAs is to impose stricter 
rules on their operations, as well as encouraging rating users to develop stronger internal risk 
assessment methods. Since the introduction of ESMA oversight, CRAs’ actions show less 
connection with each other, and stock market participants have become somewhat less 
responsive to CRAs’ opinions. However, the EU regulatory regime for CRAs is still at an 
early stage and long-term evidence is needed to draw more concrete implications.  
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Table 1- Descriptive statistics of the sovereign rating data sample 
 July 2006 – November 2014 Pre-regulation  Post-regulation  
 Moody’s S&P Fitch Total Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Row  
Solo rating downgrades 8 16 13 37 6 5 7 2 11 6 1 
Solo negative watch signals 17 33 12 62 15 14 4 2 19 8 2 
Solo negative outlook signals 20 23 23 66 12 15 14 8 8 9 3 
Combined events of rating downgrades and watch 5 10 4 19 2 7 4 3 3 0 4 
Combined events of rating downgrades and outlook 38 40 37 115 16 22 18 22 18 19 5 
Negative events 88 122 89 299 51 63 47 37 59 42 6 
Solo rating upgrades 13 20 19 52 6 7 8 7 13 11 7 
Solo positive watch signals 4 1 2 7 3 0 2 1 1 0 8 
Solo positive outlook signals 23 33 22 78 9 15 12 14 18 10 9 
Combined events of rating upgrades and watch/outlook  5 4 2 11 1 0 1 4 4 1 10 
Negative watch to negative outlook signal 3 11 3 17 2 3 2 1 8 1 11 
Positive events 48 69 48 165 21 25 25 27 44 23 12 
Total credit events (Rows 6 +12) 136 191 137 464 72 88 72 64 103 65 13 
All rating downgrades (Rows 1+4+5) 51 66 54 171 24 34 29 27 32 25 14 
   - of which by >1-notch (% row 14) 49.0% 28.8% 35.2% 36.8% 41.7% 20.6% 27.6% 55.6% 37.5% 44.0% 15 
All rating upgrades (Rows 7 +10) 18 24 21 63 7 7 9 11 17 12 16 
   - of which by >1-notch (% row 16) 16.7% 25.0% 14.3% 19.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 27.3% 35.3% 16.7% 17 
            
1-point negative action 28 45 35 108 19 27 16 9 18 19 18 
2-point negative action 18 36 12 66 15 15 8 3 21 4 19 
3-point negative action 18 21 23 62 9 13 14 9 8 9 20 
>3-point negative action 24 20 19 63 8 8 9 16 12 10 21 
Negative actions using 58-point scale 88 122 89 299 51 63 47 37 59 42 22 
1-point positive action 34 44 25 103 17 18 15 17 26 10 23 
2-point positive action 5 10 8 23 3 4 6 2 6 2 24 
>3-point positive action 9 15 15 39 1 3 4 8 12 11 25 
Positive actions using 58-point scale 48 69 48 165 21 25 25 27 44 23 26 
This Table presents summary statistics for the dataset, which comprises three CRAs. The sample consists of daily long-term foreign-currency sovereign rating, outlook and 
watch signals for 27 European countries rated by each CRA. The pre-regulation period is from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011. The post-regulation period is from 1 July 2011 to 
30 November 2014. 
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Table 2- Agreement/disagreement on European sovereign ratings 
 July 2006 – November 2014 Pre-Regulation Post-Regulation 
Agencies 
S&P and  
Moody’s 
S&P and  
Fitch 
Moody’s  
and Fitch 
S&P and  
Moody’s 
S&P and  
Fitch 
Moody’s  
and Fitch 
S&P and  
Moody’s 
S&P and  
Fitch 
Moody’s  
and Fitch 
Panel I – 20-notch rating scale          
Daily observations 57743 57743 57743 33713 33713 33713 24030 24030 24030 
Split % of whole sample 52.2% 39.9% 40.4% 48.7% 32.8% 36.5% 56.9% 49.9% 45.9% 
Higher rating from first CRA; % of spilt 31.7% 27.3% 53.0% 11.0% 19.2% 80.1% 56.5% 34.8% 22.9% 
1-notch higher rating from first CRA 6215 6001 10033 1170 1957 7550 5045 4044 2483 
>1-notch higher rating from first CRA 3319 297 2338 637 166 2300 2682 131 38 
1-notch lower rating from first CRA 15149 14186 6559 9326 7967 2221 5823 6219 4338 
>1-notch lower rating from first CRA 5434 2583 4393 5302 977 232 132 1606 4161 
Panel II – 58-point rating scale          
Daily observations 57743 57743 57743 33713 33713 33713 24030 24030 24030 
Split % of whole sample 63.1% 51.8% 52.9% 56.2% 42.8% 45.3% 72.8% 64.5% 63.6% 
Higher rating from first CRA; % of spilt 32.7% 27.0% 50.2% 10.4% 19.8% 80.0% 56.9% 33.8% 20.4% 
1-point higher rating from first CRA 2652 2047 2710 371 833 2041 2281 1214 669 
2-point higher rating from first CRA 1830 2230 1938 853 495 771 977 1735 1167 
3-point higher rating from first CRA 3585 2646 6525 37 796 5306 3548 1850 1219 
4-point higher rating from first CRA 500 969 1724 88 642 1694 412 327 30 
5-point higher rating from first CRA 620 9 604 455 9 604 165 0 0 
>5-point higher rating from first CRA 2742 196 1830 177 91 1792 2565 105 38 
1-point lower rating from first CRA 3745 4877 4428 2299 2623 764 1446 2254 3664 
2-point lower rating from first CRA 2458 2245 1446 805 1166 996 1653 1079 450 
3-point lower rating from first CRA 9980 10660 3765 6009 6124 895 3971 4536 2870 
4-point lower rating from first CRA 2747 1333 1254 2399 595 248 348 738 1006 
5-point lower rating from first CRA 858 483 329 800 414 0 58 69 329 
>5-point lower rating from first CRA 4743 2239 3984 4669 653 149 74 1586 3835 
This Table presents agreement/disagreement across three CRAs on 27 developed European sovereign ratings using the 20-notch rating scale in Panel I and the 58-point rating 
scale in Panel II. The pre-regulation period is from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011. The post-regulation period is from 1 July 2011 to 30 November 2014. 
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Table 3 – Negative sovereign credit signals and split ratings during July 2006 – November 2014   
 Indep Coef t-value Marginal Effects (ME) %  Indep Coef t-value Marginal Effects (ME) % 
   
1 
(1p dw) 
2 
(2p dw) 
3 
(3p dw) 
4  
(>3p dw) 
   
1 
(1p dw) 
2 
(2p dw) 
3 
(3p dw) 
4  
(>3p dw) 
A. Negative credit actions and split ratings between Moody’s and S&P 
Panel I- Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions Panel II- S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1N-H-SP -0.174 
 
-0.97     1N-H-M -0.309*** -2.74 -0.035 -0.028 -0.015 -0.013 
2N-H-SP -0.060 
 
-0.32     2N-H-M -0.274** -2.03 -0.028 -0.022 -0.012 -0.010 
1N-L-SP 0.020 
 
0.18     1N-L-M -0.147 
 
-1.05     
2N-L-SP 0.418*** 
 
3.37 0.038 0.024 0.023 0.025 2N-L-M 0.186 1.23     
H-Watch-SP -0.218 
 
-1.38     H-Watch-M -0.081 -0.52     
L-Watch-SP 0.278 
 
1.61     L-Watch-M -0.075 
 
-0.46     
H-Outlook-SP -0.047 
 
0.33     H-Outlook-M 0.276*** 
 
3.43 0.050 0.040 0.023 0.020 
L-Outlook-SP 0.433*** 
 
4.88 0.036 0.023 0.022 0.024 L-Outlook-M 0.223* 1.88 0.040 0.032 0.018 0.016 
Spec -0.224* 
 
-1.68 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 Spec -0.325** 
 
-2.20 -0.032 -0.024 -0.013 -0.011 
Growth -0.042*** 
 
-2.88 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 Growth -0.029*** 
 
-2.57 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Y&CO Dum Yes       Y&CO Dum Yes       
Pseudo R2 12.8%  No. of obs. 57,695  Pseudo R2 7.7%  No. of obs. 57,674  
            
B. Negative credit actions and split ratings between S&P and Fitch 
Panel III- Fitch negative sovereign credit actions Panel IV- S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1N-H-SP -0.114 
 
-0.65     1N-H-F -0.119 
 
-1.29     
2N-H-SP -0.012 
 
-0.03     2N-H-F -0.038 
 
-0.28     
1N-L-SP 0.127 
 
1.16     1N-L-F 0.075 
 
0.58     
2N-L-SP 0.399*** 
 
2.56 0.060 0.021 0.039 0.029 2N-L-F 0.345 
 
1.24     
H-Watch-SP 0.027 
 
0.12     H-Watch-F 0.022 0.15     
L-Watch-SP 0.406*** 
 
2.90 0.063 0.022 0.041 0.031 L-Watch-F 0.193 
 
1.00     
H-Outlook-SP 0.022 0.18     H-Outlook-F 0.156* 1.84 0.027 0.022 0.012 0.011 
L-Outlook-SP 0.258*** 
 
2.82 0.029 0.010 0.018 0.013 L-Outlook-F 0.253** 
 
2.44 0.050 0.040 0.024 0.021 
Spec -0.180 
 
-1.27     Spec -0.058 
 
-0.56     
Growth -0.007 
 
-0.50     Growth -0.021* 
 
-1.82 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Y&CO Dum Yes       Y&CO Dum Yes       
Pseudo R2 9.8%  No. of obs. 57,695  Pseudo R2 7.1%  No. of obs. 57,674  
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Table 3. Continued 
 Indep Coef t-value Marginal Effects (ME) %  Indep Coef t-value Marginal Effects (ME) % 
   1 
(1p dw) 
2 
(2p dw) 
3 
(3p dw) 
4  
(>3p dw) 
   1 
(1p dw) 
2 
(2p dw) 
3 
(3p dw) 
4  
(>3p dw) 
C. Negative credit actions and split ratings between Fitch and Moody’s 
Panel V- Fitch negative sovereign credit actions Panel VI- Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions 
1N-H-M -0.111 -0.89     1N-H-F -0.034 
 
-0.21     
2N-H-M 0.099 0.59     2N-H-F -0.229 
 
-1.32     
1N-L-M 0.224* 1.91 0.025 0.008 0.016 0.011 1N-L-F 0.106 
 
0.93     
2N-L-M 0.315* 1.92 0.041 0.014 0.026 0.019 2N-L-F 0.277* 
 
1.84 0.023 0.014 0.014 0.015 
H-Watch-M 0.011 0.05     H-Watch-F -0.228 
 
-1.23     
L-Watch-M 0.145 0.88     L-Watch-F 0.260 
 
1.15     
H-Outlook-M 0.146 1.43     H-Outlook-F -0.146 
 
-0.97     
L-Outlook-M 0.026 0.21     L-Outlook-F 0.406*** 
 
3.60 0.037 0.023 0.022 0.025 
Spec -0.328** 
 
-2.08 -0.019 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 Spec -0.263* 
 
-1.71 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
Growth -0.005 
 
-0.37     Growth -0.047*** 
 
-2.84 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Y&CO Dum Yes       Y&CO Dum Yes       
Pseudo R2 9.3%  No. of obs. 57,695  Pseudo R2 11.7%  No. of obs. 57,674 57,695 
 
This Table reports the results of ordered probit estimations of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) using data for 27 European countries from Moody’s and S&P, S&P and Fitch and Moody’s 
and Fitch for 1 July 2006 to 30 November 2014. The dependent variables are: 
M
t,iDN , 
SP
t,iDN , 
F
t,i
DN , which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR 
points using the 58-point scale by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch respectively, or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are as follows. 1N-H-CRA (2N-H-CRA) is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has a one notch (>one-notch) higher rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 1N-L-
CRA (2N-L-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has one-notch (> one-notch) lower rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit 
action at time t, 0 otherwise. H-Watch-CRA (L-Watch-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has watch status with a more (less) 
favourable/positive implication by the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. H-Outlook-CRA (L-Outlook-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if given sovereign has outlook status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 
Spec is a dummy taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign is rated at the speculative-grade category within the prior 90 days (by at least one CRA) before the credit action by 
the potential follower CRA, 0 otherwise. Growth is the growth rate in a given country in the year of credit action. Full sets of year and country dummies are included. We 
apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but only for 
variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold 
parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are not shown here. 
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Table 4 – Negative sovereign credit signals and split ratings between Moody’s and S&P - Sub-
period analyses 
 Indep Coef t-value Ave ME %  Indep Coef t-value Ave ME % 
Panel I- Pre-regulation Panel II- Pre-regulation 
Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1&2 N-H-SP 0.100 
 
0.24  1N-H-M -0.262* -1.70 0.015 
   2N-H-M -0.210 -1.01  
1N-L-SP 0.240* 
 
1.67 0.012 1&2N-L-M 0.010 
 
0.03  
2N-L-SP 0.803*** 5.48 0.108     
H-Watch-SP -0.464** 
 
-2.33 0.010 H-Watch-M 0.141 0.50  
L-Watch-SP 0.585** 
 
2.13 0.071 L-Watch-M -0.401 
 
-1.17  
H-Outlook-SP -0.369 
 
-1.21  H-Outlook-M 0.249** 
 
1.19 0.022 
L-Outlook-SP 0.543*** 
 
4.75 0.044 L-Outlook-M 0.135 
 
0.68  
Spec -0.089 
 
-0.56  Spec -0.043 
 
-0.19  
Growth -0.046** 
 
-2.42 0.002 Growth -0.017 
 
-1.27  
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 16.0% No. of obs. 33,692 Pseudo R2 10.3% No. of obs. 33, 688 
 
Panel III- Post-regulation Panel IV- Post-regulation 
Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1N-H-SP -0.206 
 
-1.01  1N-H-M -0.427** -2.21 0.042 
2N-H-SP -0.406 
 
-1.57  2N-H-M -0.607* -1.91 0.035 
1N-L-SP -0.233 
 
-1.47  1N-L-M 0.068 
 
0.44  
2N-L-SP 0.044 
 
0.14  2N-L-M 0.060 0.28  
H-Watch-SP 0.132 
 
0.59  H-Watch-M -0.285 -1.30  
L-Watch-SP 0.112 
 
0.45  L-Watch-M 0.104 
 
0.48  
H-Outlook-SP 0.147 
 
1.06  H-Outlook-M 0.277* 
 
1.92 0.051 
L-Outlook-SP 0.252* 
 
1.71 0.028 L-Outlook-M 0.263* 
 
1.85 0.044 
Spec -0.061 
 
-0.25  Spec 0.012 
 
0.04  
Growth -0.006 
 
-0.16  Growth -0.009 
 
-0.27  
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 10.2% No. of obs. 24,004 Pseudo R2 10.2% No. of obs. 23,986 
 
This Table reports the results of ordered probit estimations of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) using data for 27 European 
countries from Moody’s and S&P for the pre-regulation period (1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011) and for the post-
regulation period (1 July 2011 - 30 November 2014). The dependent variables are: 
M
t,i
DN    (
SP
t,iDN ) in Panels I 
and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point 
scale by Moody’s (S&P), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3. If there 
are a very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-
CRA (2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable ‘1N-H-CRA’ (‘1N-L-CRA’). In other 
words, ‘1&2N-H-CRA’(‘1&2N-L-CRA’) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 
or >1 notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 
We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability 
of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Ave ME) for variables with 
significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. ‘Ave ME’ is the mean of the ME values for the four downgrade 
categories. The ME for each downgrade category (as presented in Table 3) is not reported in the interests of 
brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% 
level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are 
not shown here. 
31 
 
Table 5 – Negative sovereign credit signals and split ratings between S&P and Fitch - Sub-
period analyses 
 Indep Coef t-value Ave ME %  Indep Coef t-value Ave ME % 
Panel I- Pre-regulation Panel II- Pre-regulation 
Fitch negative sovereign credit actions S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1 N-H-SP -0.210 
 
-0.77  1N-H-F -0.047 
 
-0.37  
2 N-H-SP -0.158 -0.39  2N-H-F 0.019 
 
0.07  
1N-L-SP 0.510*** 
 
4.15 0.064 1N-L-F -0.040 
 
-0.18  
2N-L-SP 0.962*** 
 
4.13 0.036 2 N-L-F 0.321 1.01  
H-Watch-SP 0.393 
 
1.31  H-Watch-F 0.142 0.70  
L-Watch-SP 0.737*** 
 
3.13 0.192 L-Watch-F 0.524 
 
1.50  
H-Outlook-SP -0.096 -0.46  H-Outlook-F 0.128 0.99  
L-Outlook-SP 0.498*** 
 
3.94 0.075 L-Outlook-F 0.168 
 
1.18  
Spec -0.149 
 
-0.56  Spec -0.215 
 
-0. 95  
Growth -0.015 
 
-0.90  Growth -0.001 
 
-0.07  
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 11.5% No. of obs. 33,688 Pseudo R2 10.0% No. of obs. 33,688 
 
Panel III- Post-regulation Panel IV- Post-regulation 
Fitch negative sovereign credit actions S&P negative sovereign credit actions 
1&2 N-H-SP -0.290 
 
-1.22  1N-H-F -0.252* 
 
-1.76 0.029 
   2N-H-F -0.131 
 
-0.59  
1N-L-SP 0.250 
 
1.60  1&2 N-L-F -0.058 
 
-0.35  
2N-L-SP 0.080 
 
0.42     
H-Watch-SP -0.278 
 
-0.97  H-Watch-F -0.013 -0.06  
L-Watch-SP 0.091 
 
0.39  L-Watch-F 0.239 
 
0.92  
H-Outlook-SP 0.264 1.28  H-Outlook-F 0.052 0.42  
L-Outlook-SP 0.278** 
 
2.04 0.032 L-Outlook-F 0.310* 
 
1.80 0.063 
Spec 0.219 
 
1.18  Spec 0.253 
 
1.25  
Growth -0.046 
 
1.47  Growth -0.019 
 
-0.60  
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 10.6% No. of obs. 24,007 Pseudo R2 9.7% No. of obs. 23,986 
 
This Table reports the results of ordered probit estimations of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) using data for 27 European 
countries from S&P and Fitch for the pre-regulation period (1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011) and for the post-
regulation period (1 July 2011 - 30 November 2014). The dependent variables are: 
F
t,i
DN  (
SP
t,iDN ) in Panels I 
and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point 
scale by Fitch (S&P), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3. If there are a 
very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-CRA 
(2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable ‘1N-H-CRA’ (‘1N-L-CRA’). In other words, 
‘1&2N-H-CRA’(‘1&2N-L-CRA’) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 or >1 
notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise.We 
apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability of a 
rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Ave ME) for variables with 
significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. The ME for each downgrade category is not reported in the interests 
of brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% 
level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are 
not shown here. 
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Table 6 – Negative sovereign credit signals and split ratings between Fitch and Moody’s - Sub-
period analyses 
 Indep Coef t-value Ave ME %  Indep Coef t-value Ave ME % 
Panel I- Pre-regulation Panel II- Pre-regulation 
Fitch negative sovereign credit actions Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions 
1 N-H-M 0.190 0.95  1&2N-H-F -0.080 
 
-0.29  
2 N-H-M 0.451 1.10      
1N-L-M 0.029 0.15  1N-L-F 0.359** 
 
2.18 0.027 
2N-L-M 0.469* 1.88 0.079 2N-L-F 0.405** 
 
1.79 0.039 
H-Watch-M -0.347 -1.33  H-Watch-F -0.443* 
 
-1.91 0.012 
L-Watch-M 0.472* 1.79 0.090 L-Watch-F 0.114 
 
0.25  
H-Outlook-M -0.144 -0.55  H-Outlook-F 0.052 
 
0.20  
L-Outlook-M 0.345*** 3.05 0.042 L-Outlook-F 0.556*** 
 
4.11 0.057 
Spec 0.013 
 
0.05  Spec -0.352* 
 
-1.73 0.011 
Growth 0.004 
 
0.22  Growth -0.065*** 
 
-3.06 0.003 
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 9.8% No. of obs. 33,688 Pseudo R2 13.7% No. of obs. 33,692 
 
Panel III- Post-regulation Panel IV- Post-regulation 
Fitch negative sovereign credit actions Moody’s negative sovereign credit actions 
1&2 N-H-M -0.526 -1.53  1N-H-F -0.318 
 
-1.45  
    2N-H-F -0.411 
 
-1.52  
1N-L-M -0.128 -0.57  1N-L-F -0.633** 
 
-2.19 0.016 
2N-L-M 0.140 0.71  2N-L-F -0.222 
 
-0.54  
H-Watch-M -0.360 -1.34  H-Watch-F 0.364 
 
0.88  
L-Watch-M 0.582* 1.78 0.103 L-Watch-F 0.311 
 
1.09  
H-Outlook-M -0.439 -1.34  H-Outlook-F -0.241 
 
-1.16  
L-Outlook-M 0.178 1.11  L-Outlook-F -0.340 
 
-0.89  
Spec -0.125 
 
-0.56  Spec -0.019 
 
-0.07  
Growth 0.087** 
 
2.51 0.006 Growth 0.008 
 
0.24  
Y&CO dummy Yes    Y&CO dummy Yes    
Pseudo R2 12.8% No. of obs. 24,007 Pseudo R2 13.3% No. of obs. 24,003 
 
This Table reports the results of ordered probit estimations of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) using data for 27 European 
countries from Fitch and Moody’s for the pre-regulation period (1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011) and for the post-
regulation period (1 July 2011 - 30 November 2014). The dependent variables are: 
F
t,iDN  (
M
t,iDN ) in Panels I 
and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point 
scale by Fitch (Moody’s), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3. If there 
are a very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-
CRA (2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable ‘1N-H-CRA’ (‘1N-L-CRA’). In other 
words, ‘1&2N-H-CRA’(‘1&2N-L-CRA’) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 
or >1 notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 
otherwise.We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the 
probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Avr ME) for 
variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. The ME for each downgrade category is not reported in 
the interests of brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; 
*significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all 
estimations, and are not shown here. 
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Table 7. The impact of split ratings on stock markets’ reactions to negative credit signals in European countries during July 2006 – November 2014   
 
Panel I - S&P’s negative signals Panel II - Moody's negative signals Panel III - Fitch’s negative signals 
 
S&P vs. Moody’s S&P vs. Fitch S&P vs. Moody’s Moody’s vs. Fitch S&P vs. Fitch Moody’s vs. Fitch 
 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
∆CCR -0.0025* 
 
-0.0042*** 
 
-0.0013 
 
-0.0005 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0009 
 
 
(-1.83) 
 
(-3.22) 
 
(-1.09) 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.56) 
 
∆CCR * SUP 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0040** 
 
-0.0012 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0012 
 
0.0013 
  
(0.07) 
 
(-2.49) 
 
(-0.92) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.82) 
∆CCR * INF 
 
-0.0047*** 
 
-0.0045*** 
 
-0.0021 
 
-0.0027 
 
-0.0054 
 
-0.0002 
  
(-2.72) 
 
(-2.80) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-1.25) 
 
(-1.12) 
 
(-0.05) 
CCR -0.0007** -0.0004 -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 
 
(-2.07) (-1.34) (-2.04) (-2.03) (-1.40) (-1.40) (0.12) (0.15) (0.63) (0.48) (1.21) (1.29) 
Prior Events -0.0020 -0.0019 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0009 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 
 
(-0.92) (-1.00) (0.75) (0.76) (-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.17) (0.05) (0.37) (0.42) (0.86) (0.66) 
VIX -0.127*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.111** -0.105** -0.152*** -0.157*** -0.123*** -0.127*** 
 
(-2.96) (-2.87) (-4.52) (-4.51) (-3.69) (-3.70) (-2.56) (-2.52) (-4.14) (-4.19) (-2.92) (-2.85) 
Cons 0.0428* 0.0318 0.0549* 0.0561* 0.0589 0.0589 -0.0267 -0.0277 -0.0607 -0.0588 -0.0424 -0.0439 
 
(1.81) (1.37) (1.95) (1.93) (1.56) (1.55) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.20) (-1.27) 
Y & CO dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
No of observations 180 180 148 148 158 158 128 128 154 154 146 146 
Adjusted R-squared 7.2% 8.5% 16.1% 15.4% 19.4% 18.8% 0.3% 0.3% 4.2% 4.0% 6.8% 6.2% 
             
 
This Table reports the results of Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) using data for 25 European countries rated unequally by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during the period from 1 July 2006 to 
30 November 2014. “S&P vs. Moody’s”, “S&P vs. Fitch”, and “Moody’s vs. Fitch” indicate that the samples of interest contain credit signals for sovereigns rated jointly and 
unequally by the respective pair of CRAs. The dependent variable is CAR which measures the mean adjusted abnormal return in the window [t, t +1] for the national stock 
index of the event country on day t. “SUP” and “INF” are the dummies of superior and inferior ratings assigned by the CRA announcing the credit signal compared with one 
of the other two CRAs on day t-1. CCR is the average rating on the 58-point rating scale assigned to the sovereigns affected by the credit actions on day t-1. Prior Events 
measures the cumulative rating changes by all the three CRAs during the 14 days prior to the event days. VIX is the log change in the CBOE Volatility Index calculated for 
the window [t, t +1].  Full sets of year and country dummies are included. The model is estimated with Huber–White robust standard errors. t-values are in parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * refer to significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8 – The impact of split ratings on stock markets’ reactions to negative credit signals by 
S&P in European countries – Sub-period analyses 
Panel I. S&P  vs. Moody’s 
 Pre-regulation  Post-regulation 
∆CCR -0.0047*** 
 
 0.0019 
 
 
(-2.90) 
 
 (0.91) 
 
∆CCR * SUP 
 
N/A  
 
0.0024 
   
 
 
(1.10) 
∆CCR * INF 
 
-0.0030*  
 
-0.0029 
  
(-1.80)  
 
(-1.37) 
CCR -0.0011 -0.0016  -0.0010** -0.0008 
 
(-1.24) (-1.53)  (-2.04) (-1.58) 
Prior Events -0.0007 0.0002  -0.0004 -0.0002 
 
(-1.00) (0.21)  (-0.26) (-0.15) 
VIX -0.100*** -0.117***  -0.117*** -0.116*** 
 
(-2.80) (-3.30)  (-3.05) (-3.21) 
Cons 0.0353 0.0845  0.0479* 0.0428 
 
(0.97) (1.44)  (1.92) (1.67) 
Y & CO dummy yes yes  yes yes 
No of observations 96 86  88 88 
Adjusted R-squared 17.7% 17.7%  4.8% 7.7% 
 
Panel II. S&P vs. Fitch 
 Pre-regulation  Post-regulation 
∆CCR -0.0039* 
 
 0.0016 
 
 
(-1.77) 
 
 (0.64) 
 
∆CCR * SUP 
 
-0.0038  
 
-0.0026 
  
(-1.51)  
 
(-1.21) 
∆CCR * INF 
 
-0.0043  
 
0.0031 
  
(-1.19)  
 
(1.03) 
CCR -0.0019 -0.0019  0.0001 0.0002 
 
(-1.21) (-1.17)  (0.08) (0.21) 
Prior Events 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0001 
 
(0.17) (0.20)  (-0.19) (-0.03) 
VIX -0.153*** -0.154***  -0.121*** -0.142*** 
 
(-3.26) (-3.18)  (-3.26) (-3.49) 
Cons 0.0771 0.0758  -0.0057 -0.0154 
 
(0.97) (0.93)  (-0.10) (-0.27) 
Y & CO dummy yes yes  yes yes 
No of observations 72 72  78 78 
Adjusted R-squared 11.7% 9.9%  5.6% 10.0% 
 
This Table reports the results of Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) using data on S&P’s negative credit signals for 25 European 
countries in the pre-regulation period (1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011) and the post-regulation period (1 July 2011 
- 30 November 2014). “S&P vs. Moody’s” and “S&P vs. Fitch’’ indicate that the samples of interest contain 
credit signals for sovereigns also rated (unequally) by Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. The dependent variable 
is CAR which measures the mean adjusted abnormal return in the window [t, t +1] for the national stock index of 
the event country on day t. “SUP” and “INF” are the dummies of superior and inferior ratings assigned by S&P 
compared with either Moody’s or Fitch. Other variables are defined in the notes of Table 7. Full sets of year and 
country dummies are included. The model is estimated with Huber–White robust standard errors. t-values are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * refer to significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 9 - The impact of split ratings on non-event stock markets’ reactions to negative credit signals in European event countries during Jul 2006 – Nov 2014 
 
Panel I - S&P’s negative signals Panel II - Moody's negative signals Panel III - Fitch’s negative signals 
 
S&P vs. Moody’s S&P vs. Fitch S&P vs. Moody’s Moody’s vs. Fitch S&P vs. Fitch Moody’s vs. Fitch 
 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
∆CCR -0.0019***  -0.0020***  0.0005***  0.0009**
* 
 0.0005*  -0.0006**  
 
(-7.41)  (-7.38)  (2.74)  (4.59)  (1.93)  (-2.28)  
∆CCR * SUP  -0.0006**  -0.0015***  0.0010***  0.0012**
* 
 0.0004*  -0.0002 
 
 (-2.07)  (-3.99)  (5.06)  (5.37)  (1.76)  (-0.82) 
∆CCR * INF  -0.0031***  -0.0025***  -0.0023***  -0.0001  0.0016  -0.0016*** 
 
 (-7.89)  (-7.74)  (-7.19)  (-0.40)  (1.41)  (-3.13) 
CCRi -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(-2.27) (0.01) (-1.27) (-1.52) (-3.73) (-3.95) (-0.65) (-0.33) (-1.97) (-1.78) (-1.24) (-1.03) 
CCRj -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-2.53) (-2.20) (-2.45) (-2.46) (-0.85) (-1.14) (-0.90) (-1.01) (0.86) (0.88) (-1.32) (-1.14) 
Prior Events -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0001 
 
(-0.16) (-0.27) (-2.31) (-2.42) (-0.21) (0.80) (-0.72) (0.02) (2.46) (2.31) (1.32) (0.39) 
VIX -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.069*** -0.072*** 
 
(-11.70) (-11.24) (-11.52) (-11.66) (-9.59) (-9.90) (-6.71) (-6.18) (-7.05) (-6.94) (-7.76) (-7.93) 
Constant 0.0128* 0.0050 0.0106 0.0125 0.0275*** 0.0289*** 0.0059 0.0042 0.0063 0.0057 0.0221**
* 
0.0200** 
 
(1.87) (0.72) (1.09) (1.29) (3.12) (3.28) (0.63) (0.45) (0.70) (0.63) (2.66) (2.43) 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Event & non-event Country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 4518 4518 3736 3736 3900 3900 3308 3308 3616 3616 3414 3414 
No of negative signals 92 92 75 75 79 79 66 66 77 77 73 73 
Adjusted R-squared 9.9% 10.4% 11.8% 11.9% 13.7% 15% 11.7% 11.9% 7.5% 7.5% 8.7% 8.8% 
This Table reports the results of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) using data for 25 European countries rated unequally by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 
November 2014. “S&P vs. Moody’s”, “S&P vs. Fitch”, and “Moody’s vs. Fitch” indicate that the samples of interest contain credit signals for sovereigns rated jointly and unequally 
by the respective pair of CRAs. The dependent variable is CAR which measures the mean adjusted abnormal return in the window [t, t +1] for the national stock index of foreign 
country j on day t when a credit signal occurs in the event country i.  “SUP” and “INF” are the dummies of superior and inferior ratings assigned to country i by the CRA announcing 
the credit signal compared with one of the other two CRAs on day t-1. CCRi and CCRj are the average rating on the 58-point rating scale on day t-1 of the event country i affected by 
the credit actions and the foreign non-event country j respectively. Prior Events measures the cumulative rating changes of event country i by all three CRAs during the 14 days prior 
to the event days. VIX is the log change in the CBOE Volatility Index calculated for the window [t, t +1].  Full sets of year dummy variables, event country and foreign country 
dummy variables are included. The model is estimated with Huber–White robust standard errors. t-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * refer to significant coefficients at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of daily sovereign ratings of 27 European countries from July 2006 to November 2014 based on 20-notch and 58-point rating scales. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of negative and positive signals (including actual rating changes and outlook and watch 
signals) by the largest three CRAs for 27 European countries from July 2006 to November 2014 based on 58-
point rating scale. 
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Appendix 
List of national stock market indices 
Country  Index Index name Mean S.D. Min Max 
Austria ATX  AUSTRIAN TRADED ATX INDX 0.0054 0.0123 -0.0094 0.0176 
Belgium BEL20 BEL 20 INDEX -0.0044 0.0255 -0.0495 0.0498 
Bulgaria SOFIX  SOFIX INDEX -0.0068 0.0433 -0.1003 0.1216 
Cyprus CYSMMAPA GENERAL MARKET INDEX CSE -0.0050 0.0458 -0.1100 0.1219 
Czech Republic PX  PRAGUE STOCK EXCH INDEX 0.0077 0.0454 -0.0230 0.0751 
Estonia TALSE I OMX TALLINN OMXT -0.0017 0.0302 -0.0924 0.0551 
Finland HEX  OMX HELSINKI INDEX -0.0072 0.0151 -0.0179 0.0035 
France CAC  CAC 40 INDEX -0.0022 0.0176 -0.0315 0.0395 
Germany DAX DAX INDEX -0.0307 0.0220 -0.0462 -0.0151 
Greece ASE ATHEX COMPOSITE SHARE PR -0.0082 0.0386 -0.1084 0.0903 
Hungary BUX BUDAPEST STOCK EXCH INDX -0.0080 0.0281 -0.0686 0.0714 
Ireland ISEQ  IRISH OVERALL INDEX -0.0002 0.0253 -0.0535 0.0596 
Italy FTSEMIB FTSE MIB INDEX 0.0056 0.0365 -0.0692 0.1040 
Latvia RIGSE OMX RIGA OMXR -0.0004 0.0282 -0.0760 0.0478 
Lithuania VILSE OMX VILNIUS OMXV -0.0067 0.0339 -0.1350 0.0455 
Luxembourg LUXXX LUXEMBOURG LUXX INDEX -0.0070 0.0354 -0.0320 0.0181 
Malta MALTEX  MALTA STOCK EXCHANGE IND 0.0048 0.0145 -0.0170 0.0389 
Netherlands AEX AEX-INDEX -0.0164 0.0167 -0.0343 0.0056 
Poland WIG20  WIG 20 -0.0033 0.0578 -0.0712 0.0690 
Portugal PSI20 PSI 20 INDEX -0.0078 0.0286 -0.0941 0.0524 
Romania BET BUCHAREST BET INDEX 0.0033 0.0360 -0.0507 0.0639 
Slovakia SKSM  SLOVAK SHARE INDEX 0.0108 0.0404 -0.0153 0.1093 
Slovenia SBITOP  SLOVENIAN BLUE CHIP IDX 0.0039 0.0172 -0.0271 0.0327 
Spain IBEX I IBEX 35 INDEX -0.0014 0.0249 -0.0582 0.0470 
United Kingdom UKX  FTSE 100 INDEX 0.0169 0.0312 -0.0052 0.0389 
The Table presents the national stock market indices along with descriptive statistics of the mean adjusted 
abnormal return (CAR) in the event window [t, t +1] for each index for event and matched non-event days 
during the sample period (July 2006 to November 2014). 
Denmark and Sweden are included in the analysis of Section 5.1, but not in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.  
